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About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as
well as support from the government and from private foundations, have
made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated
center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their
relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely
positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related
resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as
well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely,
education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates
both to its sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese
science and technology and on how that science and technology is
managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss an emerging organizational structure
for new product development at large Japanese automobile firms. This study
specifically focuses on describing the objectives and outcomes of changes in product
development organization implemented at Toyota in 1992 and 1993. This
reorganization is the most fundamental change in product development organization
that Toyota has implemented since it established the Shusa (product manager)
organization around 1965. The new organization is aimed at multi-project
management. It has three vehicle development centers in which multiple projects are
grouped together, in contrast to either traditional single-project-oriented or function-
oriented organizations.
Toyota has often been considered as a leader in adopting new organizational
structures and managerial processes in both manufacturing and product development.
For example, the Toyota production system, symbolized by its JIT and Kanban systems,
has been targeted as one of the best practices in manufacturing by many firms, not
only in automobiles but also in other industries. With respect to product development
organization, Toyota led in establishing a project-based management system, which
aimed at coordinating activities in different functional areas into a well-integrated
new product. Clark and Fujimoto (1991) have described this as an organization
featuring "heavyweight" product managers, who facilitate quick completion of a
project by integrating different functions such as design engineering,
manufacturing engineering, and marketing. An MIT research project, the
International Motor Vehicle Program, referred to this approach as "lean product
development" (Womack et al., 1990).
In addition to the efficient development of individual products, many studies
have shown that Toyota and other Japanese leading automobile firms have been
developing new products to add new product lines or replace existing products more
frequently than U.S. or European competitors (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Womack et
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al., 1990). Their capability in developing individual products efficiently through a
project-oriented organization helped implement the strategy of prolific product
introductions. This frequency has been overwhelming to some Western firms and has
been considered as one of the sources of Japanese firms' competitive advantages in
world markets (Fujimoto and Sheriff, 1989, Nobeoka and Cusumano, 1994). In the past
15years, for example, the number of passenger vehicle lines including sports utility
models at Toyota has more than doubled, rising from 8 to 18. Toyota also has
maintained its four-year product life cycles for most of its product lines, which is
much shorter than those in the Western firms.
In recent years, however, all Japanese manufacturers, including Toyota, have
become more concerned with efficiency in developing new products. In most of their
major markets, demand has slowed or even declined, while the cost competitiveness of
Japanese firms has considerably decreased because of the appreciation of the yen and
improvements at Western competitors. They have been facing profitability problems
that are related at least in part to the high costs of developing and manufacturing so
many new products or product variations. Therefore, Japanese firms are trying to
develop new products more efficiently while maintaining both a high frequency of
new product introductions and high design quality in individual projects.
In the highly competitive environment of the 1990sand the foreseeable future,
therefore, successful companies need to optimize not just one project at a time but a
portfolio of projects and technologies. In order to achieve economies of scale and
scope in product development as well as manufacturing, it is common for firms to
leverage their financial and engineering resource investments by reusing existing
technologies and designs in multiple projects. Firms also have to consider how to
share many components among multiple products without sacrificing an individual
product's design quality and distinctiveness. A key challenge to managers of product
development is to share technology across multiple product lines and across multiple
generations of products without overly compromising design quality and
competitiveness.
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A project management system that assigns too much autonomy to each product
manager may concentrate too heavily on developing multiple new products through
relatively autonomous project-oriented organizations. This system tends to result in
the development of many proprietary components for each project, and may require
excessive financial and engineering resources. Therefore, automobile manufacturers
may need a'product development organization that better balances individual project
performance with inter-project coordination. For example, Chrysler's project-team
approach, used for the LH and Neon projects, might only be appropriate for optimizing
the development of one product at a time. In contrast, Toyota managers have
considered that a project-team approach is not an efficient way for large firms to
develop many products concurrently that could share similar technologies and
components.
Firms that try to optimize the management of multiple projects simultaneously
need an organization that is suitable for coordinating inter-project interfaces and
interdependencies. Because most product-management research has focused on the
management of single projects, this is not helpful for managers and researchers to
understand the complexity of coordinating multiple projects. It may seem that a
traditional function-oriented, rather than project-oriented, organization is
appropriate to manage inter-project interdependencies. However, this type of
structure is weak at cross-functional integration. Functional organizations also lack a
mechanism to ensure that individual products retain distinctive features and a high
degree of what has been called "product integrity." Therefore, organizations should
aim at achieving both cross-functional coordination and inter-project coordination
simultaneously through the way they organize and control multiple projects. This
goal cannot be achieved by either traditional project-oriented or function-oriented
organizations. The inter-project interdependencies must be coordinated within the
context of a specific project as an integrated system. To share components while
retaining the distinctiveness of individual products, firms also need organizational
-4-
structures and processes that enable system-level coordination across multiple
projects.
Toyota's reorganization into product development centers represents one way to
manage multiple projects. By establishing three centers, each of which contains
several vehicle development projects, Toyota has improved inter-project coordination
among technically related projects. At the same time, Toyota has strengthened the
authority of project managers over functional managers, and this has improved cross-
functional integration. These two goals may sound contradictory, but this paper
focuses on how Toyotahas solved this contradiction. This paper is based on interviews
with three general managers, four product managers, fifteen engineers, and three
cost management planners between 1992 and 1994.
2. Problems of the Traditional Shusa Organization at Toyota
In 1953, Toyota assigned the first shusa, or product manager, to a new vehicle
project (Ikari, 1985)1. When Toyota started product development for the 1955 Crown,
Kenya Nakamura became the first shusa to head a project. At that time he was a
member of the Engineering Management Division. The shusa organization was
strengthened in February 1965 when Toyota formally established the Product
Planning Division to organize and support shusas. At that time, there were already
ten shusas 2, and each shusa had five or six staff members, which totaled about 50
members in the division. The basic organizational structure with respect to the roles
of the Product Planning Division and shusas did not fundamentally change until 1992,
when Toyotaintroduced the center organization. One of the minor changes before
that time was a change in the title name for a product manager from "shusa" to "chief
Engineer" in 1989. In order to avoid any confusion, the rest of this paper will
1 I referred to this Ikari's book with respect to the information regarding the early period of the
Shusa organization in the 1950's and 1960's.
2 Each of the ten shusas were responsible for Crown, Mark I, Publica, Century, Celica/Carina,
Toyota 2000 GT, Corona, Corolla/Sprinter, Toyoace, Miniace.
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consistently use the new term, chief engineer, to refer to this position, rather than
shusa or product manager.
After having maintained the same basic structure for more than two decades, in
1990, Toyota decided to evaluate its entire product and technology development
organization and to change it if necessary, so that the organization would fit the
competitive environment at the end of the twentieth century. Toyota launched an
initiative, called the Future Project 21 (FP21), to study any problems in its product
development organizational structure and processes. The leader of the project was
Yoshiro Kinbara, an executive vice president in charge of product and technology
development. A manager at Toyota explained that no specific threats triggered this
project. At that time, Toyota was actually doing better than most of its competitors.
People at Toyota, however, recognized that organizations sometimes needed to be
reviewed and overhauled to continue to be competitive in a changing environment. A
consulting firm3 was hired for this project evaluated the organization performance at
Toyota as a starting point of the FP2 1.
Soon after the FP21 started its studies, the team identified two important
problems. These problems led Toyota to conclude that it would need a major
reorganization. First, there was an organizational problem. A primary point was that
Toyota's product development organization had become less efficient i n
communication and had come to need more coordination tasks than before to manage
new product development. Second, the competitive environment for the Japanese
automobile industry started changing drastically around 1990, which seemed to
require Toyota to change its product development strategy and organization. Due to
various factors such as the appreciation of the yen, the Japanese auto industry faced
decreasing competitive advantages against most competitors in the world. The
following sections discuss these two problems in more detail.
3 Toyota chose the Nomura Research Institute, a Japanese consulting firm rather than prestigious
U.S. based firms such as McKinsey. A person at Toyota mentioned three reasons for this decision:
(1) A Japanese consulting firm may know more about Japanese firms. (2) Toyota wanted plans for
implementations, rather than grand strategies. And (3) a Japanese consulting firm seemed likely to
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Organizational Problems
Figure 1 shows Toyota's product development organization before its
reorganization in 1992. There were, at that time, as many as sixteen design
engineering functional divisions, and each had a functional manager. There were
about fifteen projects proceeding concurrently, even though Figure 1, a simplified
model, depicts only nine projects. Each project had a chief engineer, who was located
in the Product Planning Division under a general manager.
The product development organization was actually a huge matrix organization
rather than a project-based organization. Chief engineers and general managers in
the Product Planning Division did not directly oversee the engineering divisions in
this organization structure. However, chief engineers at Toyota were supposed to have
considerable authority over the entire product development process, including
different engineering stages, manufacturing, and product concept creation.
According to the definition by Clark and Fujimoto (1991), chief engineers at Toyota
were supposed to be typical examples of "heavyweight" product managers.
However, in reality, the product development organization at Toyota had
become much larger than before, and chief engineers started to find it difficult to
control and integrate different functional divisions when making a new product. As
the number of product development projects increased, the number of engineers also
increased. At the same time, the degree of specialization in the engineering divisions
had become narrower, reflecting the increasing number of different engineering
divisions. As of December 1991, there were about 7000people in the sixteen product
development engineering divisions. They were working, on average, on fifteen
concurrent projects. In addition, Toyota had a Research and Advanced Development
Group located at the Higashi-Fuji Technical Center. This had about 2000 additional
people4 .
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provide more value per cost than a U.S. firm.
4 7000 people in the sixteen engineering divisions and 2000 people in the RAD group added up to
Figure 1 Toyota's Product Development Organization in 1991
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In 1991, a chief engineer had to coordinate people in 48 departments in 12
divisions to manage new product development. This estimate comes from Toyota's
internal data on the number of frequent participants in meetings a product manager
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9000. There were, in total, about 11,500 people working on product development. The rest of the
people were engaged in supporting activities such as patent management, certification process
management, CAD system development, and prototype development.
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held5 . In 1976, there were only 5000 people in the entire product development
organization. A chief engineer had to coordinate only 23 departments in six divisions.
At that time, a chief engineer generally needed to talk with only six division managers
to integrate all the design engineering functions. This change indicated that, during
the fifteen years, coordination tasks had become much more complicated for chief
engineers.
In addition to this added complexity, there was another problem that made it
difficult for some chief engineers to manage a new product development project.
Some relatively junior chief engineers started to complain that they did not always
have enough authority over senior functional managers. Originally, only a limited
number of "charismatic" senior managers tended to rise to the position of chief
engineer. Toyota people often considered them as "gods" within their projects.
However, in recent years, Toyota has assigned relatively junior people to the position
of chief engineer. There are two reasons for this change. First, the number of chief
engineers required to cover all new vehicle projects had increased. Second, Toyota
recognized that people needed particular talents to be excellent chief engineers, and
their seniority was not as important as their ability.
Functional managers also found it difficult to spend sufficient time on
managing engineering details of all the vehicle projects, because most managers had
to oversee about fifteen different projects6. They did not have enough time to oversee
complicated interfaces and interdependencies between these projects either. Due to
the large number of functional divisions and vehicle projects, each chief engineer
was able to arrange for regular meetings with all the relevant functional managers
only about once every two months.
5 Even though there were sixteen design engineering divisions, a chief engineer for a particular
project did not necessarily need to manage all of these. These data were based on Toyota's internal
measurements. The Company did not explain in detail its methodology for the measurements.
6 There were a few exceptions. For example, as of 1991, there were already two separate body
engineering divisions, each of which was responsible for front-wheel-drive and rear-wheel-drive
vehicles, respectively. Therefore, each functional manager was in charge of about a half of the
entire vehicle projects.
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There was a problem also at the engineering level. Because of their narrow
specialization, engineers did not have a "system view" of the entire product. For
example, some engineers only knew about the inner body of doors and did not know
much about the outer body because interior engineering and body engineering
divisions were separate. This kind of excessively narrow specialization had a negative
impact on the development of a well-integrated product. In addition, Toyota realized
that the narrow specialization caused another problem for engineers when they were
promoted to become a manager in charge of a larger. engineering task such as the
entire body. It was difficult to train general engineering managers in this
organizational structure.
Engineers also found it difficult to have a strong sense of commitment to a
specific vehicle development. Because of the narrow specialization and the large
number of projects, each engineer frequently had to transfer between unrelated
vehicle projects. This may sound useful to transfer technical knowhow between
different projects. In reality, however, despite the frequent transfer of engineers,
Toyota found that it could not transfer system knowledge in this way. Nor was this
structure particularly appropriate for inter-project knowledge transfer.
Toyota's rapid growth in size partially caused these organizational problems.
One way to increase the chief engineer's authority and to eliminate problems caused
by narrow specialization is to create a pure project team organization, such as
Chrysler adopted for its Neon project. In this organization, almost all engineers
exclusively work for a single project for its entire duration. However, Toyota did not
consider the project team organization efficient. This type of organization can work
well for firms with a small number of projects and little technical interdependency
between multiple products concurrently being developed. Because Toyota has many
projects and a limited number of engineers, it cannot assign engineers to a specific
project for the entire duration of the project. The peak period for design engineering
work for engineers in a specific project lasts only about one and half or two years out
of a four-year project. Therefore, when a project task is outside of the peak, engineers
- 10-
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should be transferred to other projects to be utilized efficiently. In addition, a change
in the competitive environment discussed in the next section also made the project
team approach inappropriate. In the new environment, effective inter-project
technology sharing has become more important.
Even the organization at Toyota prior to 1991 had problems with respect to
inter-project coordination. One of the policies of Toyota's chief engineer organization
was to encourage the autonomy of each chief engineer with respect to his own vehicle
project. General managers in the Product Planning Division above chief engineers,
therefore, did not supervise chief engineers in the details of individual projects. I n
addition, the number of vehicle projects was too large for managers to deal effectively
with multi-project management issues such as resource allocation, technology
transfer, and component sharing across all projects.
Finally, there was a problem regarding coordination with the Research and
Advanced Development (RAD) Group located at the Higashi-Fuji Technical Center 7. The
center was maintained relatively independent of specific vehicle development
projects, so that it could focus on research and advanced engineering. However, both
vehicle projects and the RAD group were dissatisfied with this organizational
structure. Engineers for specific vehicle projects did not think that the RAD group
developed technologies that could be useful for their projects. On the other hand,
engineers in the RAD group felt frustrated because vehicle projects did not use
technologies that they developed. Toyota reached a conclusion that these two groups
needed more integration organizationally.
In summary, Toyota's product development organization had five problems.
These caused difficulties in both project integration and inter-project coordination:
1. There were too many functional engineering divisions with too narrow
specialization of engineers.
7 Because Research & Advanced Development Group was mainly located in the Higashi-Fuji
Technical Center, these two names are often interchangeably used. Higashi-Fuji is located about
150 miles east of Toyota's headquarters, which contains the primary functions for product
development. This paper uses a shorter name, RAD group, which is original here and is not used at
Toyota.
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2. There were too many vehicle projects for each functional manager to manage
the engineering details of each project as well as inter-project coordination.
3. It had become much more complicated and difficult for chief engineers to
oversee all the engineering functions.
4. The chief engineer organization was not appropriate for inter-project
coordination.
5. The RAD group and vehicle projects were not sufficiently coordinated.
Change in the Competitive Environment
The competitive environment surrounding Japanese automobile firms started
changing around 1991. There were two interrelated issues. First, rapid growth in
production levels at the Japanese firms virtually ended. The aggressive product
strategy of Japanese automobile firms in the 1980's, such as frequent new product
introductions and replacements, had been partially based on their assumption of
continuous rapid growth. The new environment seemed to require some changes in
this strategy, as well as in company organizations. Second, the importance of cost
reduction became even more critical for international competition than before. In
addition to the appreciation of the yen, Japanese advantages in development and
manufacturing productivity have been diminishing. Both factors have had a strong
negative impact on the cost advantages they had been enjoying.
Because of these changes, the traditional chief engineer system, which
primarily focused on building the best individual products one at a time, needed to be
revised. Chief engineers always thought about the success of only their own projects.
A general manager who used to be a chief engineer said, "Each product manager
wanted to increase sales of his own project even by developing many new proprietary
components and by expanding the target customer segments of his project into other
product lines within Toyota." He explained that, during the period when Toyota's
production volume was growing rapidly, these characteristics of Toyota's chief
engineer system worked well for the Company. Because total production was growing
rapidly, cannibalization of individual product lines was not a major problem. The
- 12-
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market in each product segment also expanded, and this growth made it possible for
each project to expand its target market.
In addition, Toyota was able to sell more of most new products than it had
expected. Therefore, high development and production costs caused by many new
proprietary components was not much of a problem either. A manager in charge of
cost management admitted that, "Prior to 1991,few new products met an original target
cost when it was introduced to the market. However, the sales volume for each new
product was usually larger than its original plan. The large sales volume lowered the
actual production cost compared to its original plan through scale economies. In the
end, a new product usually reached the production cost that had been originally
planned, when the entire production during its life cycle was fully considered."
Because of a faster depreciation of manufacturing equipment than original plans,
production costs also appeared to be lower than expected. Given this common pattern,
a chief engineer primarily tried to develop a new product that would sell well, rather
than a product that would meet a conservative cost target.
However, starting in 1990, Toyota's production volume stopped growing and
even started declining, as shown in Figure 2. Profit from each new product also
started decreasing. Under these circumstances, Toyota needed a new product
development strategy and organization, particularly with respect to cost management.
One particular aspect of the chief engineer system was considered inappropriate in
this new environment: The management of each individual project was too
independent. Toyota concluded that multiple related projects needed more
coordination.
First, in the stagnant market, new products should be more carefully positioned
to each other so that any cannibalization would not occur. Within a limited total sales
volume, the expansion strategy of one product line would easily cannibalize some
portion of sales of neighboring products within Toyota. Second, in order to reduce
production cost, Toyota needed to increase in commonalty of components and
technologies among multiple new products. Sales increase, which used to help cover
-13 -
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shortage in cost reduction efforts, could not be expected anymore. Under the Toyota's
chief engineer system, there was a tendency that each project overly developed its
proprietary components. There are many symptoms of the old product strategy and
organization at Toyota. For example, there are now three distinctive platforms for
three products that are similar in size and technology: the Corona/Carina, the
Celica/Carina ED, and the Camry. A chief engineer for each project wanted to develop
an ideal platform for each product.
Figure 2 Production Units at Toyota
Annual Production (000)
4000
3500 
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1000
500 , Year
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Source: Automotive Yearbook 1994
In view of these organizational problems and changes in the competitive
environmental, Toyota decided to change its product development organization rather
extensively. A new organization needed both to strengthen the integration
mechanisms for engineers in different functions so that they could create a well-
integrated new product, as well as to facilitate coordination among different projects
so that technologies and components can be effectively transferred and shared. These
two objectives are in a sense contradictory, because Toyota needed both to strengthen
its project orientation as opposed to function orientation, and to enhance inter-project
coordination. For example, a project-oriented team approach might be appropriate for
a strong project orientation, but might be inappropriate for inter-project
coordination. On the other hand, strengthening the functional orientation to
enhance the efficient usage of specific components throughout multiple vehicle
- 14-
projects would be totally unsuitable to enhance an individual product's level of
integration or coherence. Therefore, these two problems cannot be solved simply by
these two alternatives. Thus, Toyota reached a conclusion that it would fundamentally
change its organizational structure for product development.
3. Establishment of Development Centers
Toyota made two major changes in its product development organization. These
changes did not reduce the total number of people working on product development at
Toyota. At the end of 1991 before the reorganization, there were about 11,500people in
product development, and the number rose to about'12000in 1993. Rather the changes
specifically targeted the problems discussed in the previous section.
First, in 1992, Toyota divided all of its new product development projects into
three centers as shown in Figure 3. The center grouping focuses on the similarity in
platform design. Center 1 is responsible for rear-wheel-drive platforms and vehicles,
Center 2 for front-wheel-drive platforms and vehicles, and Center 3 for utility
vehicle/van platforms and vehicles. Each center has between 1500 and 1900 people,
and works on about five different new vehicle projects simultaneously. Toyota had
considered other grouping schemes, such as by product segment (luxury vs.
economical vs. sporty cars, or small vs. medium vs. large cars). Toyota chose platform
design similarity because this would lead to the highest level of inter-project design
interdependencies within a center. In addition, because new platform development
requires the most resources, sharing a platform design among multiple product lines
would save the most in engineering investment and reduce production costs most
effectively.
- 15 -
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Figure 3 Toyota's Product Development Organization as of 1992
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Second, in 1993, Toyota created Center 4 to develop components and systems for
all vehicle projects. It reorganized the Research and Advanced Development Group
(the RAD Group), and assigned most people from this to Center 4. While the RAD Group
used to work on research and advanced development rather independently, Center 4
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closely supports vehicle development by providing specific projects with components
and systems. In addition to engineers in the RAD group, Center 4 added engineers
working on some components such as electronics and new engines that did not need
much daily coordination with a vehicle project.
As discussed earlier, the center organization changes were supposed to improve
both project integration and inter-project coordination. This section specifically
describes how some key aspects of the reorganization related to improvement in these
two areas. Important features of this reorganization include:
(1) Reduction of the number of functional engineering divisions.
(2) Reduction of the number of projects for each functional manager.
(3) Changes in the roles of the center head for multiple vehicle projects.
(4) Establishment of planning divisions in each center.
(5) Adoption of a hierarchical organization for chief engineers in related
projects.
(6) The roles of Center 4.
(1) Reduction of Functional Engineering Divisions
In order to decrease coordination tasks required for a well-integrated vehicle
project, Toyota reduced the number of functional divisions for design engineering.
The complexity raised by the large number of functional divisions made it difficult for
chief engineers to manage vehicle projects. While the old organization had sixteen
different functional divisions, each new center has only six engineering divisions.
This simplification into the center organization prompted two other changes.
First, specialization in each functional engineering division widened. For example, as
shown in Figure 4, Toyota used to have two separate divisions for designing bodies and
interior/exterior equipment: the Interior Engineering Division and the Body
Engineering Division. In the new organization, the Interior Engineering Division
merged with the Body Engineering Division. Another example is the merger of two
different chassis engineering divisions, each of which had been separately
responsible for suspension systems and brakes. Each design engineering division
now has wider design responsibilities. An important point is that this did not enlarge
- 17-
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the size of each functional division, because each functional division is now
responsible for only a limited number of projects within the center.
Figure 4 Old and New Organizations for the Body Engineering Function
Old Organization ( 199 1)'
New Center Organization (1992)
r I - - X
I I
Second, Toyota also reduced the number of functional divisions to be managed in
a specific vehicle project through the usage of Center 4, the component and system
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development center. In order to simplify the work of the first three centers, Toyota
separated development of some components and systems that can be managed outside
specific vehicle projects. Toyota considered three factors to decide whether particular
engineering functions should be in a vehicle project or the component center. First,
managers decided that components that need to be extensively tailored to each vehicle
project should be managed within a project. Second, components that have to be
carefully coordinated with other parts of the vehicle design should also be developed
within the project. On the other hand, some components with modular characteristics
cal be developed separately from specific vehicle projects and still be inserted into a
product design relatively easily. These may be developed in Center 4. These types of
components and systems tend to be shared by multiple vehicle projects, and it is not
efficient to develop them in a specific project. Third, component development that
needs much new technical knowledge should be developed in Center 4. Such
development usually requires a group of technical specialists working together.
These types of components also sometimes need a long time to develop and do not fit
the time frame of specific vehicle projects.
Following these guidelines, Toyota allocated the development of some
components or systems to Center 4. For example, the upper-body design directly
visible to the customer has to be differentiated in each product. It should also be
extensively interdependent with other parts of the automobile design, such as the
chassis and interior. Therefore, the upper-body design should be managed within the
project, and Toyota maintained this function within Centers 1-3. On the other hand,
components like batteries, audio systems, and air conditioners do not usually need to be
tailored to each different vehicle project. Therefore, Toyota moved the Electronics
Engineering Divisions that developed these electronic components to Center 4.
The example of the Electronics Engineering Divisions is actually more
complicated and indicates the extensive thought and analysis that Toyota put into
implementing this reorganization. Toyota carefully examined characteristics and
interdependencies of each component development, so that Centers 1-3 can be
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simplified and yet contain all relevant components that need extensive coordination
within each vehicle project. For example, among the electronics components, the
wire harness usually needs to be tailored to each vehicle project and has considerable
interdependency with the body structure. Therefore, Toyota merged this engineering
function into the Body Engineering Divisions and kept wire harness development
within Centers 1-3.
Another example of eliminating activities from the vehicle project centers is
the development of totally new engines, which is now located in Center 4. There are
many engineering tasks involved in new engine development that are not related to
integration tasks within a particular vehicle project. In addition, the time frame of
new engine development does not fit that of specific vehicle projects. New engines
usually need about six to eight years to develop, which is longer than the 4-year lead
time of the average new vehicle project.
In this way, only component engineering that needs extensive project
integration remains in the vehicle project centers. In the old organization, part of
the product development organization was responsible for both vehicle projects and
most component development. This mixture made the old organization complicated and
difficult to manage.
In summary, by widening the engineering specialization within each division
and by transferring some component development into Center 4, Toyota limited the
number of functional divisions in Centers 1-3. In addition, because Toyota divided
each function only among three centers, the wider specialization did not require
larger functional divisions.
(2) Reduction of the Number of Projects for Each Functional Manager
Each functional manager is responsible for a smaller number of projects in the
new center organization. For example, managers in Center 1 can focus only on
vehicle projects with rear-wheel-drive platforms. Because, in some functional areas,
there used to be too many projects for functional managers to oversee, it was difficult
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for them to pay careful attention to all the projects. For example, as shown in Figure 4,
the functional manager for interior engineering was responsible for all different
vehicle projects, which usually added up to about 15 concurrent projects. In the
center organization, all functional managers are responsible for only about five
product lines that are all technologically related to each other. Each functional
manager now can spend sufficient time on the coordination with each chief engineer.
In addition, this reduction of the management scope for each functional manager
should result in more effective multi-project management in such areas as resource
allocation and technology sharing. Each functional division can also focus on fewer
types of vehicle technologies. This focus may lead to more efficient development and
accumulation of technical knowledge as a division.
(3) Roles of the Center Head for Multiple Vehicle Projects
Each head of Centers 1-3 officially supervises the entire product development
operations, including both chief engineers and design engineering functions within
the center. Equivalents to the center heads in the old organization were three deputy
general managers above chief engineers in the Product Planning Division. Each of
the deputy general managers was in charge of small cars, large cars, and trucks/vans.
They reported to the general manager of the Product Planning Division. However,
they officially managed only chief engineers, not functional managers and engineers
as seen earlier in Figure 1. These general managers above the chief engineers,
therefore, were not supposed to manage design engineering in detail. In addition,
there were also general managers above the functional managers, and it was not often
clear which general managers - those above chief engineers or those above
functional managers - had more authority. In the center organization, each of the
three center heads manages engineering details for multiple vehicle projects within
the center. From these perspectives, while the old organization was officially a matrix
organization both at the chief engineer level and at the general manager level, the
new one is organized primarily around projects.
- 21 -
____ · _;_II___^___·____ll
Using their positions, the center heads are supposed to play two important roles
that have to be deliberately balanced. First, a center head helps each chief engineer
integrate different functions. One of the key elements of the Toyota chief engineer
system has been the strong leadership of a chief engineer. However, as discussed
earlier, chief engineers recently found some difficulties in coordinating all the
functional managers. In the center organization, chief engineers can use the center
head's support to manage different functions. Second, each center head is responsible
for the coordination of different vehicle projects within the center. A center head
can now effectively implement this because he manages all the operations in the
center. The separate planning division in each center, discussed next, also helps the
center head coordinate projects.
(4) Establishment of Planning Divisions in Each Center
Each center has a planning division to support the management of each center.
The Planning Division consists of staff members and three departments: the
administration department, the cost planning department, and the product audit
department. There are about 170to 200 people in each planning division of the three
centers. The administration department is responsible for personnel management,
resource allocation, and the long-term product portfolio planning within each center.
It also conducts an advanced concept study for individual projects, before these
projects become a formal project and a chief engineer is assigned.
The equivalent of the Planning Divisions in the old organization was the
Product Planning Division. One of the major structural differences is that chief
engineers used to be located within the Product Planning Division. Most members in
the Product Planning Division directly worked for individual chief engineers. For
example, most cost management people in the division used to be divided by vehicle
project and primarily reported to individual chief engineers. On the other hand, in
the new organization, cost management people are more independent of chief
engineers and report to the planning division manager and the center head in each
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center, although they continue to work closely with chief managers. This reflects one
of the central concerns at Toyota, which is that each center needs to reduce
development and product costs by efficiently leveraging resources and components
across multiple projects.
Each center also does long-term product portfolio planning. The management
scope used to be so large in the old organization that the project portfolio planning
and resource allocation for each project were too complicated to be effectively
managed. Now the Planning Division in each center can consider technology sharing
and resource allocation among multiple projects in the present and the future more
carefully than before, by focusing on a limited number of closely related projects.
This type of center-oriented management support may be critically important to the
effective operation of the center organization.
(5) Hierarchical Organization of Chief Engineers
Another feature in the center organization is the hierarchical chief engineer
structure for managing product families as shown in Figure 5. This structure also
helps strengthen the multi-project perspective of the center organization. For
example, there used to be two separate chief engineers for the LS 300 and the Supra
projects. Now, there continue to be two chief engineers, but one of the two supervises
both the LS 300and the Supra projects, and primarily manages the LS 300 project. The
other chief engineer manages the Supra project and reports to the chief engineer of
the LS 300. Toyota also made the same kind of change for another pair of projects: the
Tercel and the Starlet. Although this type of structure is not adopted for all projects,
Toyota appears to be moving the organization in this direction.
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Figure 5 Hierarchical Chief Engineer Organization for Multi-Project Management
Discrete Chief Engineer Hierarchical Chief Engineer
Organization (Old) Organization (New)
....... _. f n__ l.. .. . . ·
-Chiet ngmieer-( Product A )
Thief Engineer-( ProductB )
-Chief Engineer-( Product )
- Chief Engineer-( ProductD)
- nlert nginee rluuut 
Chief Engineer ( Product B)
- Chief Enginee, Product C
Chief Engineer ( Product D)
Each of these pairs of projects share almost identical platform and drive train
designs, even though these two projects target completely different customer
segments and have separate product concepts. For example, the LS 300 is a luxury
personal car and the Supra is a sports car. Therefore, it is important to manage the
two projects separately, so that each project develops a product that fits with its own
customer needs. A planning division manger at Toyota says that it is difficult for a
single chief engineer to develop two products with widely separate concepts and to
give the same level of commitment to each of these. However, at the same time,
because these two projects should share the same platform design, they need extensive
coordination. Therefore, the projects have to achieve differentiation in product
characteristics and integration in product development at the same time. The
hierarchical chief engineer organization is one way to pursue these two goals
simultaneously.
(6) Roles of Center 4
As explained earlier, Toyota based Center 4 primarily on the RAD group in the
old organization. As shown in Figure 6, the basic structure of the organization and
technical areas has not significantly changed. Technical areas of both the old and
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new organizations include vehicle (body and chassis), engine and drive train,
electronics, and materials. The most important aspect of the change was that, while
Center 4 focuses on developing components and systems for vehicle projects, the RAD
Group was relatively research-oriented. The relationship between the RAD group and
vehicle projects was that between upstream and downstream organizations. Center 4
has virtually become a part of the vehicle development organization, and is
responsible for system components that could be better developed outside specific
vehicle projects.
The RAD group had about 2000people, while there are about 4000in Center 4. As
discussed earlier, some components or systems like electronics and new engines can
be developed more appropriately outside specific vehicle projects. Centers 1-3 can
now focus on achieving project integrity.
One of the most significant improvements regarding Center 4 was the
introduction of a new organizational mechanism, called the cross-area system project.
Development of some new systems need new technical knowledge in multiple
technical areas. To develop such new systems, Toyota formed a project teams
containing engineers and researchers from multiple technical areas. These projects
are temporarily located in the Planning Division in Center 4, and their leaders are
selected and assigned by the head of Center 4. In the old RAD Group, different
technical areas usually worked separately and their coordination mechanism was not
strong enough to deal with this type of project.
For example, Toyota recently developed a new low-cost Anti-lock Brake System
(ABS). Center 4was responsible for developing of the new ABS. In this case, similar
systems could be used for all vehicle projects. It is not efficient if either an individual
vehicle project or a product development center develops this type of new system. Its
development needed new technologies in the areas of chassis, electronics, and
materials. Toyota thus formed a project team including people from these technical
areas to develop the new ABS. A manager at Toyota says that the cross-area system
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project significantly improved the efficiency of developing this type of new system
component.
Figure 6 Center 4 and its Original Organization
Old Organization: Research & Advanced Development Group (RAD group)
Senior Managing Director
in change of Reseach &
Advanced Development
i Administration Div.
Vehicle Research & Advanced Eng. Div.
Engine Research & Advanced Eng. Div.
R &D Div. I (Engine)
R & D Div. !1 (Materials)
R & D Div. III (Electronics)
New Organization: Center 4 Cross-Area System Projects
Center Head-
Planning Div.
I 
. -A2;Lcb nn~~v n .
I hicci rnmt.nnnent Fno
-El
Drive Train Eng. Div. I - III
Electronics Eng. Div. I - IV
I Material Eng. Div. - III
Fnoinp Fnoinperinao iv I - ITTII
The head of Center 4 is supposed to work on integrating all the divisions of the
different technical areas more actively than his predecessor in the old organization.
In the old organization, the division managers of the different technical areas were
relatively independent. Because in the RAD group, technical inventions within each
technical area were important, top management gave each division relatively strong
autonomy with respect to research agenda and time frame. The introduction of the
cross-area system projects represents the new orientation of Center 4, as well as the
important role of its center head.
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Toyota Central Research & Development Laboratories, Inc., which has about 1000
researchers, continues to work on basic research as a separate R&D unit. In addition,
because Center 4 became less research-oriented, Toyota established a new Research
Division internally, and assigned about 500researchers to this, primarily from the old
RAD group.
Summary of the Changes in Organizational Structure
Figure 7 summarizes the changes in the vehicle development organization from
the old product development group to Centers 1-3, and in the component/system
development organization from the RAD group to Center 4. The product development
group was simplified in two ways by the new center organization. First, it excluded
some areas of component and system development in order to focus on the integration
of product development activities, rather than component and system development.
This change reduced the number of people in the core product development
organization from about 7000to 5000. Second, the entire organization was divided into
three centers. As a result, each center has only about 1500 to 1900 people. It is a
drastic change with respect to management scope, if compared with the original size
of 7000people.
Regarding the component and system development organization, there was a
shift in orientation from research to system development. Because Center 4 is
responsible for the development of more components and systems than the RAD group,
the number of people increased from about 2000to 4000.
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Changes in the Coverage of the Vehicle Development and the
Component/System Development Organizations
Change in Coverage of Product Development Organization
Basic Research
Development
Advanced
Engineering
Development
Product
Development
Basic
Components Systems
Change in Coverage of Component Development Organization
Basic Research
&
Development
Advanced
Engineering
Development
Product
Development
Basic
Components Systems
Old Orgnaization c:New Organization
Source: "Outline of Toyota Technical Center", Toyota Motor Corporation, 1991 and 1993
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4. Outcomes of the Organizational Changes
Il I I 
Because of the introduction of the center organization, Toyota achieved
significant improvements in several areas. In particular, it simultaneously improved
both cross-functional project integration and multi-project integration. This section
discusses some important outcomes of the reorganization, focusing on these two
perspectives, as well as some potential problems of the reorganization.
Project Integration through Streamlined Structure
Figure 8 summarizes the outcomes of the reorganization with respect to the
reduction of coordination tasks for chief engineers to manage different functional
groups. As discussed earlier, before the reorganization, each chief manager had to
coordinate, on average, 48 departments in 12 divisions to manage new vehicle
development. Primarily because of the reduction in the number of functional
divisions and departments, in the new organization a chief engineer has to manage
only 15 departments in 6 divisions. Toyota also compared these numbers with those
back in 1976, when there were only about 5000 people working for product
development. At that time, each chief engineer had to communicate with 23
departments in 6 divisions. The change into the new organization reduced the
communication complexity down to the level in 1976, when the Shusa organization
worked more effectively than the time just before the reorganization.
Each functional manager and engineer now covers a wider portion of the
automobile design. Because of this, cross-functional coordination tasks had naturally
decreased among chief engineers as well as engineers, which directly affected the
effectiveness and the efficiency of project integration. In addition, it has become
relatively easy for functional managers and engineers to see the entire picture of a
vehicle project. This change also solved some other problems in the old organization.
Engineers can train on the job for the time when they will be promoted to a manager,
because they can now obtain knowledge of a broad scope of component engineering.
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Engineers can now also obtain more sense of achievement regarding specific vehicle
projects. This seems to have positively affected the level of engineers' commitment
and job satisfaction.
Figure 8 Changes in the Number of Divisions to be Coordinated
Number of Divisions/Departments
50
40
30
20
10
0
E Division
o Department
1976 1991 1993
Source: "Activities and Achievements of FP21", Toyota internal document, 1994
Because each functional manager is responsible for fewer vehicle projects than
before, it has become easier for a chief engineer to communicate frequently with
functional managers. There used to be regular meetings among a chief engineer and
the entire functional managers only about once every two months. Now, chief
engineers and the six functional managers, as well as the center head, have weekly
meetings, called the Center Management Meeting.
The introduction of the center heads also greatly contributed to the
improvement of project integrity. Chief engineers both in the old and the new
organizations have not assumed formal authority over functional managers. On the
other hand, center heads oversee all product development projects, including the
work of functional managers. The Center heads can work directly on integrating
different engineering functions. Using this position, they also support chief
engineers to coordinate different functions. For example, when a chief engineer
encounters difficulty in negotiating with a strong functional manager, he can discuss
the issue in the Center Management Meeting, and the center head may support the
chief engineer. Decisions made as a center can be smoothly and quickly implemented.
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In this sense, through the combination with the center head, chief engineers
regained the strong authority that the original Shusas used to enjoy.
Table 1 summarizes achievements on some important measurements. The new
organization helped reduce development costs on the average project by 30 percent.
The number of testing prototypes used in the average product development project
decreased by 40 percent. This reduction of prototypes was a primary source for the
reduction in development costs. The reduction of the number of testing prototypes has
reflected the effective communication in the organization. In order to test many
different items in one prototype, an intensive coordination among different design
divisions and testing divisions is needed. For example, without appropriate
communication, it is difficult to install the testing items for interior equipment and
chassis into a single prototype. Because of the simplification of the line of
communication and project coordination, Toyota has also increased the extent of
simultaneous engineering, which has helped cut project lead time by a few months.
Stronger project management supported by the center head may also have contributed
to quicker decision making and development processes.
Table 1 Outcomes of the Reorganization to the Center8
Performance change Major factors
Development cost -30% *Reduction of prototypes
(average project) *Increase in component sharing
Number of prototypes *Intensive coordination between
(average project) -40% different engineering and testing
functions
*Increase in CAE usage
Lead time Shortened by a few *Reduction of prototypes
(average project) months *More extensive simultaneous
engineering
Source: "Activities and Achievements of FP21 " Toyota internal document, 1994
8 We rely on the data a manager at Toyota has provided us. He said that these numbers are based on
a comparison of similar projects. We were not provided with details of the measurement
methodology. These numbers include not only direct outcomes of the change in the organization
structure but also those of accompanying process changes. In addition, some factors that are not
directly related to the reorganization, such as the increase in CAE usage, are also included.
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Multi-Project Integration within a Center
The new organization strengthened the multi-project management perspective
with the strong leadership of the center head and strong support from the center-
oriented planning division. Because of the large number of vehicle projects, it was
difficult to manage Toyota's entire project portfolio and inter-project coordination.
Now, the weekly Center Management Meetings discuss the details of multi-project
management. In addition, each center now has its own building so that all members
within a center can be co-located. Co-location at Toyota emphasizes the geographical
integration of the center members rather than just the members of an individual
project, which is becoming common in the U.S.
In order to achieve the integration within a center, to begin with, each center
defines its own vision and theme for product development. Sharing a basic vision that
focuses on projects within the center helps members effectively coordinate
engineering activities. The current development themes of each center are:
* Center 1: Development of luxury and high-quality vehicles
* Center 2: Development of innovative low-cost vehicles
* Center 3: Development of recreational vehicles that create new markets.
One example of the changes can be seen in cost management activities. Targets
for development and product costs used to be set and managed mostly at the individual
project level, led by individual chief engineers. Most cost management staff members
used to work directly for chief engineers and their orientation was the cost
performance of individual projects. In the new organization, in addition to the cost
management at the project level, each center manages the cost target of all the
projects within the center, led by the center head. Cost management staff members
are now located in the Planning Division in each center and report to the planning
division manager and the center head. Through this new organizational setting, cost
management is supposed to add the multi-project management perspective.
Specifically, each center has been working on more component-sharing among
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multiple vehicle projects, which is one of the most effective ways to reduce product
costs. In order to achieve this, project-level management alone was not sufficient.
With respect to component sharing, one critical issue each center is now
working on is the reduction of the number of basic platforms utilized among multiple
products. For example, in Center 2, currently there are five distinctive platforms: 1.
Celica / Carina ED / Caren, 2. Camry / Vista, 3. Corona/ Carina, 4. Corolla / Sprinter, and
5. Tercel / Corsa / Starlet. The planning division manager in Center 2 believes that
five different platforms for these compact-size front-wheel-drive models are too
many. Center 2 is planning to significantly reduce the number of the platform
designs within a few years.
People at Toyota tended to think that, because each of the five platform designs
had been produced at the level of more than 200,000 units/year, a distinctive design
could be justified by economies of scale. This is true with a distinctive die that is
needed for different platform designs, because at that level of production, each die is
fully used for its life cycle. However, there are many other areas that could benefit
from the reduction of platform designs. Some areas that could expect much cost
reduction from platform sharing include prototype production, testing, designing, and
component handling. The planning division manager concludes that one of the major
challenges for the center in general is to develop multiple products that use as many
common components as possible, and still enable each product to provide customers
with as much differentiated functions and values as possible. The focus of each
Planning Division on the limited number of technically related projects within the
firm has facilitated more careful project portfolio management within the center.
With respect to component systems smaller than the platform design, Toyota has
started a component sharing program that monitors component and system usage in
individual projects. Toyota chose 290 different component systems for this program,
which ranges from a system assembly like an instrumental panel to a small
component like a door regulator. A center makes a list of a limited number of
component variations for each component group. A new product development project
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is then supposed to choose a component from the list. When a vehicle project wants to
invest in the development of a new component design, it must come up with a new
design with a better cost-value ratio than any of the existing components on the list.
When a new component design meets the requirement, it replaces one of the
components on the list, so that the total number of variations will not increase within
the firm. Because of the center organization, management of this program has
become practical and effective. In the old organization, because of the large
management scope, this type of sharing was not managed properly.
One of the other signs of the integration of center members is a sense of inter-
center competition that center heads and members have begun to possess. The three
centers have been competing with each other regarding the percentage of cost
reduction compared to past projects that had been developed before the
reorganization. This competition has a positive impact on organizational learning.
The center head encourages engineers to learn any superior processes from other
centers 9. Each center has its own engineering functional divisions such as body
engineering and chassis engineering. Three engineering divisions for the same type
of technologies and components are competing. For example, when one body
engineering division comes up with an effective idea for cost reduction, the other two
divisions are strongly encouraged to learn the idea, so that they will not stay behind
other centers.
Other activities have started within each center to strengthen the center
integration, which directly or indirectly helps multi-project coordination within the
center. For example, Center 1 held a design and engineering competition in which
groups of young designers and engineers compete with innovative cars for a motor
show. Center 3 has started a program called the "Let's Challenge Program," which
encourages center members to submit any interesting and useful ideas for new
9 The competition may have a negative impact on organizational learning in some other firms, if
each center tries not to transfer its good processes. At Toyota, this does not seem to be the case.
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models. Each center also publishes its own news letter. These activities and programs
enhance the intra-center integration,
Potential Problems of the Center Organization
The planning division manager of Center 2 raised two challenging problems.
First, it is difficult to balance the chief engineer's autonomy and the center
integration. Extensive guidelines given to each chief engineer from the center
management may cause a negative impact on the motivation and commitment of chief
engineers. Toyota doesn't want chief engineers to think that they should work only
on what the center decides. This planning manager believes that the center
management provides basic and critical guidelines, in which chief engineers
maintain authority. There are six people who play a critical role in. the center
management: three center heads and three planning division managers. Except for
the planning division manager of Center 3, who used to be an engine design manager,
five of the six used to be chief engineers. This personnel assignment may help avoid
any unnecessary misunderstanding between the center management and chief
engineers.
Second, there may be some problems regarding inter-center coordination. The
center grouping based on technology and design relatedness aimed at minimizing the
inter-center coordination requirements. For example, the old GM organization, which
was based on divisions such as Chevrolet and Buick, created difficulties because similar
designs and technologies were utilized by products in different divisions and resulted
in excessively similar products. Compared to that kind of grouping, the center
organization at Toyota is more appropriate for a product development organization
that tries to share components and produce distinctive products. However, there are
still some problems. The planning manager in Center 2 mentioned one example.
When sports-utility vehicles became a hot segment, all three centers proposed the
development of such models. Because Toyota doesn't need to develop three sports-
utility vehicles in parallel, inter-center coordination was required. Although inter-
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center coordination could become the next problem for Toyota, benefits from the
inter-project integration within the center seem to surpass the potential problems at
this point of time.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
This case study has explained changes in the product development organization
at Toyota. There are several important points we can learn from this case. First, this
paper confirms that this change was definitely the first major reorganization of
product development at Toyota since its establishment of the Shusa organization in the
mid-1960s. Figure 9 describes the hypothetical evolution pattern with respect to the
organizational orientation in product development. Toyota shifted from a function-
oriented to project-oriented structure, and, as Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 276-280)
discussed, by the late 1970s, most Japanese companies had followed Toyota. By the mid-
1980s, some Japanese firms, including Toyota, had shifted to strong project-oriented
management systems. This paper has argued that Toyota has shifted again from
project-oriented management to multi-project management. One of the most
important aspects of effective multi-project management is to improve both cross-
functional and inter-project integration at the same time. Cross-functional
integration tasks have to be streamlined so that additional tasks for inter-project
integration can be done practically. The center organization seems to be a good
solution, at least for Toyota.
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Figure 9 Evolution Pattern to Multi-Project Management
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Second, in order to benefit from the center organization, a structural change of
grouping some projects together is not sufficient by itself. Most other automobile
firms in the world also employ some type of product grouping. However, the grouping
alone does not necessarily lead to effective multi-project management, and
organizations at most firms do not seem to work as effectively as Toyota'o. Toyota made
several important changes along with the introduction of the multi-project center
organization. For example, it reduced the number of engineering functions in Centers
1-3, and addedthe component and system development center (Center 4). In this way,
each center is simplified enough to simultaneously manage multiple projects within
the center. The management scope of center heads and planning division manager is
small enough to oversee all activities within the center. A powerful planning division
with more than 150people in each center also seems essential to support the center
head. Clear goal-setting specific to each center helps integrate center activities. Each
10 This statement is based on interviews at Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Mazda. At these firms, one
example of the differences from Toyota is that some key functions such as planning and cost
management are not divided into centers. However, a comparison with other firms is our next
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center is encouraged to compete with other centers in performance, which leads to
effective learning within the firm. The center organization at Toyota works
effectively because all of these supporting mechanisms have been carefully designed.
Toyota seems to have established an organizational structure and process for
product development that will set new standards for international bench-marking.
This change has also come at an appropriate time. Because many other competitors
have adopted heavyweight product manager system, in which Toyota had enjoyed
leadership in the 1980's, Toyota's advantage over competitors had been disappearing.
However, we may not exactly know the real benefits or problems of the new
organization because new vehicle projects that started after the reorganization have
not been introduced to the market yet. We need to continue to study the center
organization at Toyota, as well as similar organizational changes in other automobile
firms.
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research agenda, and we need to wait awhile before reaching a conclusion.
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